● One source of truth
Status
What runs, what is built but off, what is not ready.
This table is the reference for the project's state. If another page says something different, this page wins — and please tell us. It is updated with every release, and each row names the code version it refers to. Updated 2026-10-25.
Live network
Read from the chain right now
| Chain id | … |
| Node binary | … |
| Source commit | … |
| Block height | … |
| Governance proposals | … |
Components
Status by component
“Internal multi-model AI review” means independent read-only review rounds by AI models until they agree (see Security & Audit). It is not an independent human audit — that column says None yet until an external audit is done.
| Component | Status | Code version | Internal review | External review | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chain | |||||
Sovereign chain sunima_8081-2 (Cosmos SDK + CometBFT + EVM) | Running on testnet | v17 | — | None yet | Re-created 2026-09-02; upgrades only by governance vote (#1 v15, #2 v16, #3 v17). |
Operator program x/operators: registration, bond, probation | Running on testnet | v17 | Internal multi-model AI review | None yet | |
Court-order disclosure x/courtorder: intake, vote, threshold decryption | Running on testnet | v16 keys · v17 | Internal multi-model AI review | None yet | Key is 6-of-8 across validators, dealt by one party in v16. |
| Court-order key generated by validators (DKG, 75 %, auto re-share) | Built, switched off | v17 | Internal multi-model AI review | None yet | Needs the key group enabled by governance. |
Validator key groups x/threshold_signatures (DKG, re-share, FROST) | Built, switched off | v17 | Internal multi-model AI review | None yet | Each group is enabled by a governance vote; none enabled yet. |
| Vault door key Key_A / Key_B (OpenCore) | Not ready | v17 | Internal multi-model AI review | None yet | Keys not generated on the live network yet. |
| Exit breaker on the private vault · founder pause auto-expiry 72 h | Running on testnet | v17 | Internal multi-model AI review | None yet | |
| Address freezing | Removed | v14 | — | — | Removed 2026-07-23. No one can freeze an address. |
| Privacy | |||||
Halo2-KZG confidential deposits and transfers x/layer7_core | Running on testnet | v17 | In progress | None yet | Testnet quality; mainnet privacy layer still being hardened. |
| In-browser Halo2-KZG prover | Running on testnet | web | — | None yet | Shielded send ≈19.5 s. |
| Bridge | |||||
FrostVerifier · SunimaBridge v9 · btUSD on Arbitrum Sepolia | Running on testnet | contracts 2026-10-25 | Attack-vector review of FrostVerifier + BIP-340 test vectors | None yet | Testnet contracts. |
| Bridge fast tier on Sunima (validator attestations) | Built, switched off | v17 | Internal multi-model AI review | None yet | Governance proposal #4 is enabling it. |
| Bridge attester agents on validators | Not ready | — | — | None yet | Next after proposal #4. |
| Bridge final tier (Ethereum light client) | Not ready | — | — | None yet | |
| Operators and network | |||||
One-command installer operator.sh + signed upgrade kit | Running on testnet | kit 2026-10-24.1 | Internal multi-model AI review | None yet | |
| Season 1: quests, operator / validator grants, points → stake | Running on testnet | off-chain services | — | None yet | Testnet program. |
| Security and launch | |||||
| External audit (Sherlock, Pashov Audit Group, Go / Cosmos-SDK specialist) | Not ready | — | — | None yet | Firms confirmed when engaged. |
| Immunefi bug bounty | Not ready | — | — | — | Starts at mainnet. |
| Mainnet | Not ready | — | — | — | Gated on the items above. No date. |
Privacy guarantees
What is hidden and what is visible (testnet, v17)
| Step | Visible to everyone | Hidden |
|---|---|---|
| Enter the private pool (deposit) | Funding address, amount, time | — |
| Transfer inside the pool (Halo2-KZG shielded notes) | That a private transfer happened, the number of inputs and outputs, the account that broadcast it, time | Amounts, sender and receiver inside the pool, which notes were spent |
| Leave the pool (exit) | Recipient address, amount, time | Which deposit the money came from |
| Plain wallet transfers outside the pool | Everything, as on any public chain | — |
So: amounts and links are hidden inside the pool; entering and leaving are public. With little traffic, an observer can try to match entries and exits by amount and timing — the privacy set grows with usage. Splitting amounts and waiting before exit helps. Not yet externally audited.
Privileged roles
Who can do what — and what if the founder disappears
Every key or group that can change the network, move protocol funds, approve disclosure or stop something. Team-held keys are listed as such.
| Role | Held by | Threshold | Rotation | If the founder disappears |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chain upgrades and parameters (x/gov) | All stakers, by stake | Quorum 67 %, yes 67 %, veto 33.4 % (expedited: 75 %) | Vote | Unaffected — validators and stakers keep governing. |
| Validator set | 12 validators; most stake on foundation-run nodes | CometBFT: >2/3 of power signs each block | Anyone can join through the operator program | Chain keeps running; foundation stake stays delegated. |
| Founder pause | Founder key | 1 key | Upgrade | Not needed. Any pause expires by itself after 72 h (v17). |
| Court-order filing gate | Two team keys: automated form check + founder approval | Both signatures on every order | Upgrade only | No new court orders can be filed until governance replaces the keys by upgrade. Known centralisation point; to be replaced before mainnet. |
| Court-order decryption key | 8 validators, one share each | 6 of 8 (75 %) | Re-deal by upgrade today; automatic DKG re-sharing built in v17, not yet on | Unaffected. |
| Vault door key (OpenCore: Key_A + Key_B) | Key_A: validators (75 %) · Key_B: founder, 4 of 5 parts | Both halves | Key_B recovery: recovery key or 3 of 5 parts + passed vote + 14-day delay | Not generated on the live network yet. |
| Bridge v9 administration (Arbitrum Sepolia) | Temporary threshold key held by the team | Threshold Schnorr signature + strict nonce | Rotate by signed governance call; target: validator key group | Recovery address (team) can rotate; to be replaced by the validator key group. |
| Stage 1–4 contracts (Arbitrum Sepolia) | Founder EOA 0x61DA…1D9f | 1 key | Planned Safe multisig, not done | Contracts frozen in their current state. Testnet research only; not used by the sovereign chain. |
| Upgrade release signing (cosmovisor kit) | Team key | 1 key | Re-key by publishing a new kit | Validators can still upgrade by hand. |
| Testnet faucet and foundation delegator | Team hot keys | 1 key each | — | Testnet only. Mainnet has no faucet. |